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Supplementing the Assumed
Deimitions: A Commentary on
Professor Brownstein's Analysis of
Abortion Protest Restrictions
Leslie Gielow jacobs*
INTRODUCTION

Professor Brownstein 's analysis of the proper scope of abortion protest speech restrictions' is thoughtful and well-reasoned.
I share with him the intuition that the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act) 2 does not violate the Constitution, but that the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence,
and particularly its recent decision in RA. V. v. City of St. Pau~s
cast a shadow upon that conclusion. In fact, I would argue that,
in addition to RA.lCs prospective spectre, the Court's free
speech j urisprudence has already adversely affected the FACE
Act because the Act's prohibitions were crafted to conform to
an inappropriately limited . concept of the extent the Constitution permits the government to regulate abortion protest activities.• Mter discussing the constitutionality of the FACE Act, Professor Brownstein argues that prohibition of harassment, beyond
intimidation, and of some speech , other than unprotected
threats, may be constitutionally appropriate. Again, I agree. But

• Assisrant Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. B.A.,
1982, Wesleyan University; J.D., 1985, University of Michigan.
' Alan E. Brownstein, Ruks of Engagtment fur Cultural WaT.J: Regulating CO'I'Iduct, Unprr>t«tal Speech, and ProtecUd &JmssWn in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 553
( 1996).

.

' Freedom of Access to Clinic Enu-ances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West Supp.
1995) .
• 505

u.s. 377 (1992).
' Stt, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen &: Michael W. McConnell, TM Doubtfol Constitutionali? of
tM Clinic Access Bil~ I VA. J. Soc. Pol.'Y &: L. 261 (1994) (providing testimony to Senate
Committee about constitutionality of proposed FACE Act, which resulted in several changes
restricting its scope).
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crucial to applying the general analyses are the definitions contained within them . In my view, several of the definitions assumed within Professor Brownstein's analysis and the analysis of
courts that have reviewed the FACE Act are too narrowly understood . Accordingly, I argue that there is a supplementary concept appropriate to each. I advocate adding "impact" to the
definition of viewpoint discrimination, adding "equality" to the
definition of the abortion right, and adding "women's perspective" to the definition of a threat within the FACE Act.
I. SUPPLEMENTING THE AssUMED D EFINITIONS
A. Adding "Impact" to the Definition of Viewpoint Discrimination

Professor Brownstein begins his discussion of the constitutionality of the FACE Act by pointing out that although all of the
lower federal courts that have reviewed the FACE Act have
found it constitutional, their analyses have been less rigorous
than the Supreme Court's recent decision in R.A. V. would indicate they should be. In particular, R.A. V. holds that content
discrimination with respect to unprotected speech must undergo
strict scrutiny. Although much of the FACE Act prohibitions can
be classified as conduct-based and thus subject to a lower level
of scrutiny pursuant to the Court's decision in Wuconsin v.
Mitchell,5 at least the prohibition of threats covers pure speech
and therefore would seem to fall within the R.A. V. rule. The
lower courts, Professor Brownstein argues, have not applied strict
scrutiny to this aspect of the FACE Act either because they have
failed to understand R.A. V., or more likely, because of an unstated judgment that the R.A. V. rule makes no sense. Professor
Brownstein agrees with the lower courts' decisions not to subject
the FACE Act's threat prohibition to strict scrutiny, and also
agrees that the Court in R.A. V. could not have meant what it
said. Strict scrutiny of government regulations of unprotected
speech, he argues, is properly limited to viewpoint discrimination. Content discrimination with respect to unprotected speech
should be subject to a multi-factor balancing test.
• 508 U.S. 8!1!1 (199!1). The court held that penalty enhancement for hate crimes is
constitutional ld. at 8!15.
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Professor Brownstein 's detailed analysis provides the Court
with a~ excellent basis for retreating from a decision that undoubtedly swept too broadly. It may be very useful in cases
where neither the purpose .n or the impact of a government
regulation on unprotected speech is viewpoint-based. My concern is with the application of this analysis to the FACE Act.
Professor Brownstein concludes that the FACE Act threat prohibition is viewpoint-neutral and therefore easily passes the multifactor l:>alancing test that he proposes. All the lower courts that
have looked at the issue have implicitly agreed, concluding that
the FACE Act is viewpoint-neutral without isolating the threat
prohibition for special consideration. 6 These courts have also
noted that this feature distinguishes the FACE Act from the
viewpoint-discriminatory ordinance at issue in RA. V. 7
I disagree both with the conclusion that the FACE Act threat
provision is properly analyzed as viewpoint-neutral and the conclusion that the FACE Act's viewpoint neutrality distinguishes it
from the ordinance at issue in RA. V. Despite the justified criticism heaped upon the RA. V. decision by Professor Brownstein
and others,8 in determining whether a government action is
viewpoint-discriminatory, this decision, by looking beyond the
face of the government regulation to its practical effect, in fact
provides a deeper, more speech-protective analysis than that
traditionally employed. For those who believe that the government should protect access to abortion, overlooking the RA. V.
decision's analysis of viewpoint discrimination might have the
salutary short term effect of promoting an analysis that renders
Set, e.g., Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (S.D. Cal. 1994)
(noting that statute is not discrimina10ry on basis of content); S« also American Life
League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 648-50 (4th Cir.) (finding FACE Act to be both content
and viewpoint neutral), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995).
' See, e.g., American Lift L.uJgue. 47 F.!ld at 648 (noting that if Act was content or
viewpoint discriminatory, then strict scrutiny mandated by R.A. V. would apply).
1
See, e.g., United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 , 1258 (7th Cir. 1993) (Flaum, J.,
concurring) (noting inapplicability of R.A. V. analysis to prevention of intimidation
provision in Fair Housing Act}, ctrt. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1369 (1994); Akhil R. Amar, The Cast
of the Missing Ammdments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REv. 124, 125 (1992)
(proposing that racial hate speech should be treated differently than other fonns of hatefilled expression); Charles R. Lawrence lll, Crossbuming and the Sound of Silence:
Antisubordination T11Mry and the Fmt Ammdment, 37 VJU.. L. R£v. 787, 788-91 (1992)
(criticizing Court's emphasis on consti tutional rights of attackers as opposed to rights of
victims of hate speech).
6
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all aspects of the FACE Act constitutional. Nevertheless, I think
the better long tenn strategy for those in favor of women's
rights, and minority rights in general, is to embrace the RA. V.
analysis of viewpoint discrimination, acknowledge that the FACE
Act properly fits within it, and develop an analysis that responds
to !his conclusion.
The portion of !he FACE Act at issue punishes anyone who
"by .. . threat of force ... intentionally ... interferes with ...
any person because that person is or has been . . . obtaining or
providing reproductive health services." 9 The argument that it is
viewpoint-neutral is that reproductive health services can be
provided on both sides of the abortion debate. 1° Consequently,
a prohibition against threats that interfere with providing such
services on its face limits a certain fonn of unprotected speech
about the entire subject matter of reproductive options, rather
than targetting and limiting solely anti-abortion expre~ion.
This demonstration that the FACE Act threat prohibition is
facially viewpoint-neutral .is plausible and consistent with a number of the Court's decisions. 11 But that its superficial facial neutrality is enough to avoid the classification of viewpoint-discriminatory in light of RA. V. is less clear. The ordinance invalidated
in RA. V. punished " [w] hoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, . . . which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alann, or resentment in others on the basis of
race , color, creed, religion, or gender." 12 On its face, the St.
Paul ordinance prohibited speech about particular subject matters that resulted in certain reactions. This can be seen as viewpoint-neutral because a range of different ideas about the listed
subject matters could cause the listed reactions. Justi<:e Scalia,
for the Court in RA. V., acknowledged as much when he carefully distinguished the language of the ordinance, which prohibited
"abusive invective . . . addressed to one of the specified
' 18 U.S.C.A. § 248.
•• Stt, e.g., Ammcan Lift League, 47 F.!ld at 649 (noting that "[t]he Act ... protects
acceSii to all reproductive health services, Including both abortion and services connected
with carrying a fetus to tenn.").
11
Stt Brownstein, supra note I, at 636 n.l61 (citing cases and arguing to support this
claim).
" R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380.
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disfavored topics" from "its practical operation," which went
"even beyond mere content discrimination , to actual viewpoint
discrimination." 1' He found it "obvious" that the symbols
targeted by the ordinance were those "that communicate a
message of hostility based on one of the [] characteristics." 14
This message he distinguished from messages of racial tolerance,
which he determined not to be covered by the ordinance. 15
Therefore, the ·st. Paul ordinance singled out those who espouse
intolerant views for punishment.
This saine reasoning should result in the same conclusion
with respect to the threat prohibition of the FACE Act. Although the subject matter of "obtaining reproductive services"
theoretically covers both sides of the abortion debate, it is "obvious" to most of us that the FACE Act targets speakers who
"communicate a message of hostility based on" someone's desire
to obtain or provide reproductive services. Analogous to the
hostile. messages prohibited by the ordinance in R.A. V., this
message can be distinguished from messages of tolerance of
reproductive choices, which are not prohibitted by the FACE
Act. Viewed this way, the FACE Act threat prohibition singles
out those who are intolerant of certain reproductive choices for
special, disadvantageous trea.t ment.
Reading the FACE Act threat prohibition as viewpoint-neutral
requires a suspension of disbelief equal in magnitude to the one
Justice Scalia refused to adopt in R.A. V. It is possible that a
symbol of racial tolerance could provoke anger, resentment, or
alarm and thereby fall within the terms of the St. Paul ordinance. To find such expressions not covered, the Court relied
upon a common sense understanding of the actual intended
operation of the ordinance, supporting its conclusion with legislative intent as articulated in the ordinance 's title and as construed by the the city's counsel and the state supreme court. 16
Similarly, it is possible that a pro-choice believer could threaten
someone because they are obtaining or providing a reproductive
service other than abortion. But most of us know that, like the
IS /d. at 391.
" /d. at 392.
" /d. at 393-94.
11
/d. at 391-92.
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placement of the hypothetical symbols of racial tolerance, this
simply is not happening. 17 1n fact, in the context of the abortion issue, this possibility may be even less likely than that symbols of racial tolerance will provoke the requisite reactions. Unlike the dichotomy between beliefs in racial tolerance and racial
supremacy, support of the abortion right does not necessarily or
even usually imply hostility toward those who seek or provide
alternate services. As with the St Paul ordinance, the FACE
Act's title makes clear its purpose - to provide free access to
reproductive clinics. Its legislative history confirms that the FACE
Act's purpose was to protect access to abortion services. 18
Where one side of the issue believes in choice about
reproductive services and the other side seeks to restrict the
available options, a very fine distinction is required to
demonstrate that a government regulation designed to preserve
the availability of all reproductive options by restricting speech
that opposes any particular option is more viewpoint-neutral
than the ordinance in R.A. V.
I think that the above discussion shows that the prohibition of
threats under the FACE Act is properly analyzed as viewpointdiscriminatory. At least it shows that the FACE Act prohibition
of threats and the St. Paul ordinance's prohibitions are
appropriately analyzed as the same type of discrimination. In
either case, it is not possible to preserve the R.A. V. decision and
still apply anything less than strict scrutiny to the FACE Act
threat prohibition.
Of course, the malleable nature of the distinction between
content and viewpoint discrimination and the Court's fact-specific articulations about it19 mean that it is possible to distinguish
the FACE Act threat prohibition from the R.A. V. ordinance.
11
The most possible scenario is that pro-choice supporters outside an abortion clinic
would threaten so-called "sidewalk counselors· or those abortion seekers who listened to
them. Section 3(e) of the FACE Act covers "counseling .·. . relating to the human reproductive system," and tl1erefore, such behavior by pro-choice supporters might be covered by
the FACE Act. This is perhaps the scrongest ground for arguing that the threat prohibition
of the FACE Act is viewpoint neutral.
" See SEN. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., lst Sess. 2 (1993) (stating that Act prevents use
of forceful and threatening tactics against abortion·related services).
•• Sle Brownstein, supra note 1, at 554 n.3 (noting that Court's determinations of
whether law is content discriminatoty or viewpoint discriminatoty "seems far more result
oriented than principled").

1996]

Supplementing the Assumed Definitions

645

This distinction, coupled with Professor Brownstein 's analysis,
could assist the Court were it inclined to find the FACE Act
constitutional without completely abandoning its decision in
RA. V. Despite this possible result, I still find it unwise to advocate the method of classification necessary to get there.
As demonstrated above, distinguishing the FACE Act from the
ordinance in RA V. depends upon an extremely formal , facial
interpretation of the statute that is at odds with reality. The
government's intent in enacting the FACE Act was to eliminate
certain speech that is hostile to the free exercise of reproductive
choices. The FACE Act's practical effect will be to
disproportionately silence one side of the abortion debate.
These factors should lead to close scrutiny of the government's
justification for limiting speech. Although in this situation the
formal view could lead to a result that serves women's interests
by preserving access to abortion, in many instances a formal
view of government neutrality has ignored women 's interests and
those of other historically disadvantaged groups. 20 A constitutional analysis that includes the practical impact of government
actions is particularly important to groups, like women, who may
be underrepresented in the initial decisionmaking process.' 1
Professor Weinstein is concerned about judicial viewpoint
discrimination. 22 But judges at least must listen to both sides
and write opinions that remain available for criticism and review.25 I am more concerned about entities not subject these
procedural checks and rigid judicial categories that preclude
examination of what these entities were doing. By contrast to
to Set, e.g., Personnel Adm' r v. Feeney, -442 U.S. 256, 280 (1979) (finding state's
preference for hiring veterans facially neutral despite its disproportionate impact on
women); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating that racial impact of
government action "(s] tanding alone, ... does not trigger (strict scrutiny analysis under
the Equal Protection Clause)"); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (finding
that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination).
" Set, e.g., Martha Minow, Ftwrw(lrd: jwtict Engendn'ed, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 38-45
(1987) (pointing out that unstated male norm in equal treaonent j urisprudence harms
members of politically less powerful groups who have different needs than men and that
analysis of impact of ostensibly neutral rules can reveal when this is case).
·n James Weinstein, Pru Speech, Abcrtion Access, and the Problem of judicial Vrewpoint
Di.scrirat1141ion, 29 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 471 (1996).
" See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Even More HOMSt 17utn E~ &furr: Abandoning Prrlense and
Rtcrtating Ugilirruuy in Constitutional lnUrJmtation, 1995 U. IU.. L REv. 363 (advocating
articulate decisionmaking to enhance the legitimacy of constitutional decisionmalting).
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facial categorizations, impact analysis casts a wider net subjecting
to close constitutional scrutiny government actions that unconsciously disregard minority group interests as well as those consciously designed to discriminate against them. 24 As discrimination moves from overt to more subtle actions, this more probing
analysis becomes increasingly important' to protect minority interests.25 Therefore, taking the longer view, further enshrining
a formal distinction to achieve an immediate result is not in
women's interests.26 These interests, and constitutional jurisprudence in general, are better served by seizing upon, and emphaSlZlng, the Court's willingness to look to the "practical
operation" of a government regulation to determine the level of
scrutiny to be applied.
B. Adding "Equality" to the Definition of the Abortion Right

If the FACE .Act threat prohibition is classified as viewpointdiscriminatory, then under either the RA. V. decision or Professor Brownstein's revised analysis it must be justified under strict
scrutiny review. Currently, this classification is nearly always fatal.
But I think it is time for a change. Strict scrutiny should mean
that the government interests must be fully ar.ticulated and examined, not that they are never sufficient. Under this standard,
the FACE Act threat prohibition, as well as other government
regulations of abortion protest speech, should pass.
Although Professor Brownstein does not undertake a strict
scrutiny analysis with respect to the FACE Act, his discussion of
constitutional compromises in Part V is closely related. In that
part, he asks whether any compelling state interests justify restricting protest activities outside abortion clinics even ·though
" Su Lcsli~ Gi~low Jacobs, Adding Chmplexity to C0'11jusilm and &tmg the Light: Feminist
Legal Insights anct the jurisfrrutk'na of the Religiqn Clau.w, 7 YAL£ J.L. & FEMINISM 137, 157
(1995) (arguing that "[t)he focus on n~utrality as lack of. conscious int~nt to
discriminate . . . rewards willful ignorance of minority religious beliefs on the part of
government decisionmakers with less constitutional scrutiny").
u &e, e.g., Barbara j. Flagg, "Was Blinct But N001 I &e": Whitt IW:e Consciousness anct tM
Requiml&tfll of DiscrimiMICry Inttnt, 91 MICH. L REv. 953 (1993) (afguing for impact
analysis).
,. Su, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Mtlhod.s, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 862 &
n.l34 (1990) (staling that "[f]eminists have found lhat neutral rules and procedures tend
to drive underground the ideologies of the d~cision maker, and that these ideologies do
not ~rve women's interests well.").
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they constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.
Professor Brownstein presents several argume nts in support of
the government's ability to regulate some otherwise protected
abortion protest activities. He asserts that the government has a
compelling interest in protecting women's health and in protecting the constitutional right to choose abortion. He also argues
that because the free speech right of abortion protestors may
disproportionately interfere with women's right to choose abortion, the state may constitutionally intervene to protect the latter.
I agree with this analysis as far as it goes. My conce rn is that
the grounding for the particular judgments may not be obvious
to someone less sympathetic to a woman's right to choose abortion. The fact that a medical procedure is involved may not be
precise enough as it leaves open the possibility of prohibiting
speech any time that adverse health effects result from it. The
fact that the right to choose abortion is a constitutionally fundamental right does not explain its scope. Some would argue that
the constitutional right to choose abortion allows the · government only to ensure physical access to abortion services. Most
basically, the issue with respect to abortion speech limitations is
how to accommodate two rights that clash at the boundaries.
What is required is an explanation beyond intuition of why
abortion seekers and providers may be protected from speech
when in other contexts the Constitution would protect the expression.
In my view, a crucial supplement to the governme nt's justification for limiting a bortion protest activities is the equality basis of
the abortion right. Privacy, or autonomy, rights a re not natural
rights. Their definitions depe nd upon social understandings
about the intersection between the individual and the community.27 Under this view, abortion is a constitutional right because
in our society people are not required to make similar bodily,
economic, or social sacrifices to support the lives of other com" Set Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Nonviolent Abortion Clinic Protau: Reevaluating Some Cumnt
&sumpti(Yfi.S About the Proper &opt of Gowmment Rtgulations, 70 TUL 1... REv. 1359, U74
(1996) [hereinafter Nonvioknl Abortion Prottsu] (noting that our current understanding of
individual liberty
a social choice"); ut generally LAURENCE H . TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES (1985) (illustrating in number of different contexts how Court's constiwtional
decisions represent choices among variety of competing visions of constitutional meaning}.

:is
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munity members. 28 Outlawing abortion would force women into
a role not imposed upon men. Until such bodily sacrifice becomes an obligation of all community members, male or female,
the right to choose abortion must be part of the constitutional
guarantee of personal autonomy and privacy.29
The equality basis of the abortion right grounds ·the line
between the constitutional rights of abortion protestors to speak
and the right of abortion seekers to avoid their expression. It is
not only that a medical facility is involved that renders abortion
seekers captive. It is also the fact that only women must take to
the public streets to effectuate their right not to bodily aid another individual. Because of their biology, abortion seekers can
be identifie4 and targeted by protestors who disagree with their
decision. By contrast, men can make the same t}rpe of moral
decision not to aid another human being in their homes, where
the Court has held that a privacy right protects them from unwanted expression.30 This inequality supports classifying abor.. Specifically, the argument runs as follows:
Maybe it would be acceptable for a majority of the population to decide to
force women to carry conceived embryos to term if it were willing to impose a
similar obligation on men to donate their body to the care of others in
need... . [P]erhaps it would be acceptable for a majority of the population to
restrict access to abortion if it were willing to neutralize the social, economic,
and political consequences of pregnancy and childbirth so that the 'cost' in
these areas to women forced to carry fetuses to term were the same as to all
other citizens.
See N()'llvident Abortion Protests, sufml note 27, at 1375-76.
.. Others have noted that the abortion right is best understood as based on sex

equality. See, t.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, A.M£RJCAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1354 (1988) (arguing
that "[a) right to terminate one's pregnancy might . . . be seen more plausibly as a matter
of resisting sexual and economic domination than as a matter 'o f shielding ' private'
transactions between patients and physicians from public conuol"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Tlwughts ()'II Autonomy and Equality in Rtlation to RIM v. Wadt, 63 N.C. L REv. 375, 386
(concluding that "[o)verall, the Court's Roe position is weakened ... by the opinion's
concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a
constitutionally based sex~uality perspective"); Kenneth Karst, Pqrrwqrd: Equal Citiunship
Urukr the Fourl«nth Amendment, 91 HA.Rv. L. REv. 1, 58 (19?7) (arguing that issue in Court's
pregnancy, abortion, and birth control cases was "not so much in recognizing a woman's
interest in controlling the use of her body" as "an issue going to women 's position in
society in relation to men"); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections ()'II Sex Equalily Under Law,
100 YAL£ I.:J. 1281, 1319 n.16S (1991) (stating that "the real constitutional issue raised by
criminal abortion statutes like that in Roe is sex equality").
"' See Frisby v. Schultz, i87 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (stating that "important aspect of
residential privacy is the protection of the unwilling listener").
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tion seekers directly outside abortion clinics as captive, thereby
heightening their ability to avoid unwanted expression, and
simultaneously lessening the protestors' right to deliver iLg1
Adding this understanding of the equality basis of the right to
choose abortion to the constitutional analysis should ensure that
the threat prohibition of the FACE Act, as well as the additional
abortion protest speech prohibitions discussed by Professor
Brownstein, pass strict scrutiny review.

C. Adding . "Women's Perspective" to the Definition of
Threat in the FACE Act
In addition to defining the scope of regulation of protected
speech, the equality basis of the abortion right should also
ground the definition of unprotected speech , specifically threats
within the meaning of the FACE Act. The impact of speech may
differ according to the respective social and political powers of
the speaker and recipient.'2 Specifically, vehement exhortation
targeted at individuals seeking abortions may have a particularly
painful or destructive impact because these historically subordinated role of women in American society." Abortion protesters
are able to exploit the fears of stigma and discovery because
these fears have particular significance in the context of abortion. Women who seek abortions are stigmatized in ways that
people who refuse to give aid in other ways are not because of

" See Nonviblent Abortion Protests, supra note 25, at 1434 (stating that "a speech analysis
that protects individuals from painful, dis[Urbing, or psychologically damaging expression
only in the home treats women who choose abortion differently from other individuals who
choose not to aid others and thus violates the equality ideal that should underlie the right
to choose abortion").
" Professor Charles Lawrence provides the following explanation:
There is a great difference between the offensiveness of words that you would
rather not hear - because they are labeled di rty, impolite, or personally demeaning - and the injury inDicted by words that remind the world that you
are fair game for physical attack, evoke in you all of the millio ns of cui[Ural
lessons regarding your inferiority that you have so painstakingly repressed, and
imprint upon you a badge of servitude and subservience for all the world to
see.
Charles R. Lawrence lll, If Ht Hollers Ltt Him Go: &guJating Racist SfJ«Ch on Campus, 1990
DUKE L.J. 456, 472-73.
:13 Set id. at 453 (arguing that "[t]he subordinated victim of fighting words also is
silenced by her relatively powerless position in society.").
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the social expectations ·about women's appropriate role. 54 Moreover, the fear of discovery is not just of stigma, but of physical
violence or financial abandonment by male partners. Both dangers are experienced particularly acutely by women. 55 Also,
wome n may generally perceive the mode of delivering messages
differently than men; women 's more vulnerable position to male
violence may cause them to perceive threats more readily.36 All
of these different effects of anti-abortion speech on women
seeking abortions mean that the Court's current First Amendment assumptions require abortion seekers to bear a larger
burden of the commitment to free speech than individuals who
otherwise choose not to use their bodies to enable others to
survive.57 Consequently, the Court should ask whether particular
speech constitutes a threat from the perspective of abortion
"

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunst.ein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Refmnce to
Aborticn, and Surrogacy), 92 CoLUM. L. REV. l , 36 {1992) {"[T]he history of

P~Yrf~~Jgraphy,

abortion restrictions unambiguously supports the claim that in fact, such restrictions are
closely tied up -.ith, indeed in practice driven by, traditional ideas about women's proper
role."). See genn-aUy Janet Maslow Cohen, A jurisprudence of Doubt: Deliberative Auto1wmy and
Aborticn, 3 COLUM. J. GENtlER & L. 175, 193-219 {1992) {chronicling history of abortion
restrictions focusing particularly on move towarch government intervention in abortion
seekers' deliberative autonomy).
,. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-95 {1992) (finding that
spousal notification requirement for women seeking abortions constitutes undue burden
on right to choose abortion because many women "may have~ very good reasons for not
wishing to inform their husbanch of their 'decision to obtain an abortion," including "fears
of physical abuse," fears of "provok[ing] further instances of child abuse", fears of
"devastating forms of psychological abuse . .. , including verbal harassment, threats of
future violence, the destruction of possessions, physical confinement to the home, the
withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the abortion to family and friench.").
•• Cf Cynthia Grant Bowman, St~et Hara.ssment and the Infrmnal Ghettoiullion of Womn1,
106 HARv. L. REv. 517, 540 (1993) ("[Any incident of srreet harassment] remind[s] women
that they are vulnerable to attack and demonstrate(s] that any man may choose to invade a
woman 's personal space, physically or psychologically, if he feels like it.").
" Professor Lawrence's article beautifully illustrates thiApoint;
Whenever we decide that racist hate speech must be tolerated because of the
importance of tolerating unpopul ar speech we ask blacks and other subordinat·
ed groups to bear a burden for the good of society - to pay the price for the
societal benefit of creating more room for speech . ... We must be careful that
the ease with which we strike the balance against the regulation of racist
speech is in no way influenced by the fact that the cost will be borne by others.
Lawrence, Jv.pra note 32, at 472.
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seekers, rather than from the perspective of members of the
general public who are expected to ignore harsh messages and
tum away.
CoNCLUSION

Professor Brownstein presents strong analyses that could help
a court that is inclined to find a variety of abortion protest
speech restrictions constitutional. In my view, reconceiving several of the definitions assumed \\ithin his analysis would create a
constitutional jurisprudence even more protective of women's,
and minorities', rights.

